The consequences of the war against Ukraine are causing frustration and tension even among Russia’s elite. The power structures created by Vladimir Putin, which consist of various clans, are beginning to falter. To assess how Russia might evolve, it helps to understand the most important of these clans and the tools they use to wield power.
von Roman Anin
19. May 2026
Every month, the Russian army loses more than 35,000 soldiers while achieving almost no significant advances on the battlefield. At the same time, Ukraine’s drone strikes deep inside Russian territory are becoming increasingly effective and damaging. The Economist recently described the situation as a possible turning point in the war. Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of Britain’s best-known military experts, told the magazine that the current moment increasingly resembles a strategic turning point in the war.
Russia’s economy is slowing down sharply. Regional budget deficits are growing, businesses are struggling under extremely high interest rates, and inflation continues to push prices upward. Disruptions of mobile communications and internet shutdowns across many Russian regions have added to public frustration, creating growing social discontent that the Kremlin can no longer easily dismiss.
Inside the Russian elite, tensions are also rising. According to an intelligence report recently published by IStories, Financial Times, and CNN, senior Russian security officials are increasingly blaming one another for failures in Ukraine.
Ahead of the Victory Day parade on Red Square, Vladimir Putin asked Donald Trump to persuade Volodymyr Zelenskyy not to strike Moscow during the celebrations. A leader who wants everyone to believe he is winning the war does not ask his enemies for a temporary pause so he can safely watch a parade of a heavily depleted army.
Vladimir Putin has fallen into a trap of his own making — a system built not on democratic institutions, but on informal rules and competing clans organized around money, security structures, political influence, and personal loyalty to the Czar. For decades, Putin acted as the ultimate arbiter between these groups, balancing their interests. But as the pressure of war grows and Putin’s authority weakens, the balance inside the elite is beginning to break down.
Different factions are now quietly preparing for an uncertain future — strengthening their control over financial resources, security agencies, and even private military forces. To understand where Russia may be heading in the coming years, it is necessary to understand the key clans that dominate the Russian system today — and the struggle that may begin once the current balance of power finally starts to collapse.
To understand the trajectory of the Russian state in the coming years, it is essential to map the primary actors who will likely participate in the inevitable Russian Game of Thrones.
IStories and CORRECTIV have built profiles of the most influential Russian clans, their leaders, and the assets they control. The project focuses mainly on groups that possess not only formal political authority but also real physical power through control over security services, armed structures, or other coercive institutions.
For that reason, the profile does not include figures often described by the media as “technocrats” — such as Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, and others. Although they occupy senior government positions, they do not appear to possess the kind of direct coercive power that could play a decisive role in a future struggle for power in Russia.
This profile covers some of the best-known and most powerful Russian clans and groups, but it is not a complete list of all potential actors in Russia’s potential “Game of Thrones”.
Rosgvardia (National Guard)
Viktor Zolotov (72 years old) met Vladimir Putin in the early 90s by a stroke of luck. According to the former head of the Security Service of Russia’s first president, Alexander Korzhakov, he hired Zolotov out of desperation — there were no people.
Therefore, when the then-mayor of St. Petersburg asked Yeltsin to provide him with protection against St. Petersburg gangsters in the early 90s, Korzhakov decided to get rid of Zolotov and sent him to guard Sobchak.
In St. Petersburg, Zolotov met Putin and soon became responsible for his protection and that of his family members. When Putin became president, he appointed Zolotov as head of the Presidential Security Service.
For many years, Zolotov remained in the shadow of his boss. However, after mass protests against election fraud broke out in Russia in 2011, which Putin perceived as a conspiracy by Western intelligence agencies with part of the Russian — primarily liberal — elite, he decided to promote his bodyguards to leadership positions in law enforcement and other government agencies.
Putin appointed Zolotov as head of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops, which in 2016 were renamed Rosgvardia and removed from the MVD into an independent paramilitary structure with 350,000 personnel.
In this post, Zolotov is essentially tasked with the same mission he has performed for the last 35 years — guarding Putin and his power. For these purposes, in 2023, following the failed mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Putin issued a decree transferring heavy equipment to Rosgvardia. Now, in the event of internal unrest, Putin’s bodyguard will be able to use heavy tanks against the Russian people.
There is no doubt Zolotov will decide to do so: as one of the leaders of the Russian criminal world told me, in St. Petersburg criminal circles, Zolotov had the nickname „The Pierced“ (Probitiy)—for his cruelty and unquestioning loyalty to the Tsar.
State Council
Presidential Administration / Personnel Policy Commission
Presidential Security Service (SBP)
Federal Customs Service
Ministry of Emergency Situations (MCHS)
Bank Rossiya, National Media Group (NMG), SOGAZ
Kurchatov Institute, Presidential Council for Science and Education
Presidential Administration (Internal Policy), Rosatom, VK
Science and Education
Accounts Chamber of the RF / Energy
Government of St. Petersburg
Prosecutor General's Office
Rostec
Transneft
Government
Rosnano, Military-Industrial Commission (VPK)
Rosneft
Novatek, Sibur, ex-Gunvor
Department of Military Counterintelligence (DVKR) of the FSB
Ivan Tkachev (Lieutenant General) led the 6th service of the FSB’s Internal Security Directorate, created with Sechin’s direct participation to purge the political and economic field of opponents. The „Six“ gained a reputation as an „Oprichnina“.
After UMB, Tkachev headed Department „K“ of the FSB, and then moved to the post of head of the Department of Military Counterintelligence (DVKR) of the FSB.
During full-scale war, the DVKR exercises direct oversight of the Ministry of Defense and monitors the distribution of giant defense budgets.
Independent Oil and Gas Company (NNC)
Government of the RF
Mostotrest, SMP Bank, Sheremetyevo, Domodedovo
Platon System, Gazprom Burenie
SMP Bank
Russian Railways (RZD)
Ministry of Defense of the RF
General Staff
GRU
FSB
FSB
Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and Combatting Terrorism (2nd service of the FSB)
Assistant to the President
Tsargrad Media, private armed units
Text und Recherche: Roman Anin (iStories) Deutsche Übersetzung: Silvia Stöber, Alexej Hock Design: Muhammad Faraj Redaktion: Justus von Daniels Kommunikation: Nadine Winter