Despite sanctions: Putin‘s war waged with European machinery
Without machines from abroad, Russia’s weapons factories would grind to a halt. This analysis of Russian import data shows German and European companies supplied goods with potential dual-use applications over 28,000 times in the lead-up to the invasion. How this has impacted the war is often overlooked.
„Do not forget this” – in late February, Sergey publishes this message on his Telegram channel, where for years he has documented the weapons used by Russia in Ukraine. „The white foam-padded decoys of the Gerbera air-defence system contain different types of warheads – 3 to 5 kg of explosives!”
The Gerbera is a Russian drone inexpensively constructed from foam, polystyrene and wood. Its main purpose: to overwhelm Ukrainian air-defence systems. The Gerbera confronts defenders with a dilemma – many of the drones are harmless decoys whose interception would not be strictly necessary, but expensive. Yet some models carry cameras or explosive charges, like those Sergey documented in photographs this winter. Those drones can be lethal.
Earlier this year, the European Union also had a close encounter with the Gerbera. One of the drones entered Polish airspace, putting NATO on high alert.
Europe indirectly supporting Russia‘s war
Russia can build drones like the Gerbera – complete with camera and warhead – thanks to support from abroad: Much of its weapons production simply would not be possible without imported machinery. Through these deliveries, Europe, including Germany, contributed to Russia’s militarisation – and to a far greater extent than was previously known, as this investigation by CORRECTIV.Europe demonstrates.
The warhead in the drone documented by Sergey is manufactured, according to an analysis by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, by Russian weapons manufacturer Npo Bazalt. Producing it requires a range of metalworking machinery.
Upon completion, industrial machinery is also used to check whether all joints are properly welded and ensure the entire warhead is free of cracks, sealing flaws or structural weaknesses. One such machine is the CR-Scanner HD-CR 35 NDT produced by German manufacturer Dürr Ndt. Investigations by CORRECTIV.Europe show that Npo Bazalt purchased precisely this machine.
The route taken by the Dürr Ndt products illustrates how potential dual-use goods may have found their way into some of Russia’s most opaque weapons manufacturers despite the sanctions.
Goods such as Dürr Ndt’s HD-CR 35 NDT can be used for both civilian and military purposes, meaning authorities classify them as dual-use items. Particularly in the case of the CR scanner, the potential military application is unmistakable – the company even advertises this in one of its brochures. Since 2014, the export of such products to Russia has been subject to increasingly stringent EU sanctions. At the time of this investigation’s publication, Dürr Ndt has not responded to any enquiries from our editorial team.
The years leading up to the full-scale invasion were decisive for Russia’s militarisation.
The period leading up to 2022 was crucial for Russia’s preparations for the attack on Ukraine – and so were the machine tools supplied by European states at the time. Our analysis shows that between 2019 and March 2022, more than 28,000 shipments to Russia very likely contained dual-use goods – items that can be used not only for civilian but also for military purposes. From Germany alone, 9,273 such shipments were recorded. These machines could very likely still be producing for the defence industry in Putin’s war today.
In cooperation with freelance journalist Dylan Carter and the Tools of War platform, CORRECTIV.Europe evaluated more than 861,882 records of Russia’s import from 2019 to March 2022. The data was provided by ImportGenius, a trade information company based in the US.
The data concerns exported machine tools from all EU member states as well as Switzerland, the UK, Norway, Ukraine, Turkey and Iceland to Russian industry, including the arms sector. It also provides details of the timing and geographical origin of the goods entering Russian industry as well as the supplier companies in Europe.
Methodology and Data
About the data:
The data
The dataset concerning Russian customs information comes from ImportGenius. After cleansing, it comprises 861,882 entries on machine tool imports from 2019 to 2022. It contains shipments from the EU, the UK, Norway, Ukraine, Switzerland, Turkey and Iceland. Each entry includes product details, information on importer and supplier, geolocated addresses, shipment date and declared freight value. 125,536 entries were classified by AI as having potential for military application, making them potential dual-use goods. 94,293 of these originated in EU states.
Cleansing the data
The data was evaluated in two steps. First, Dylan Carter’s team deciphered the addresses of suppliers and importers. Then they used an AI model trained on manually verified datasets. The AI estimates how great the dual-use risk of an item is. Its F1 score is about 0.74. The F1 score, which indicates how well the model avoids false positives and missed cases, amounts to 0.74. A score of 1 would be perfect but is unattainable.
CORRECTIV.Europe further cleansed the data: country names were standardised, regional details added, descriptions and names translated into English. The names of suppliers were also merged using specialised software when they appeared in different variants. This enabled our newsroom as well as our network of local and freelance journalists across Europe to work with the dataset.
Limitations
Despite the large volume of data, there are clear limits. Machine tools can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Individual datasets, therefore, do not prove sanctioned exports or a direct role in Russian weapons production. The AI provides clues, not definitive assessments. These must be individually examined. Furthermore, there are gaps in the raw data, such as missing supplier addresses at certain times during 2020. Nevertheless, the data clearly shows how extensive and consistent machine tool deliveries to Russia were between 2019 and early 2022.
The largest product group of exported machine tools consists of measuring and testing devices. All products in this category have both civil and military applications. Whether they are officially designated as dual-use goods could not be ascertained, they can only be determined with a certain probability. What is clear: they are built to be used for many years. Once they wind up in the weapons industry, they remain a long-term contributor to militarisation. Most deliveries came from countries such as Germany, Italy, and Sweden.
After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, exports of such goods may have required a special permit under EU sanctions. Dürr Ndt did not respond to enquiries about how its machinery could have ended up in the possession of a sanctioned Russian weapons company.
According to our research, in 2010 Dürr Ndt appointed St Petersburg-based company Newcom Ndt as its exclusive distributor for Russia, Belarus and the Caucasus region. Through Newcom Ndt, image plates, scanners and radiography systems manufactured by Dürr Ndt entered the Russian market.
A contract archived by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, shows that in December 2016, Russian distributor Newcom Ndt supplied the sanctioned Russian state-owned weapons manufacturer Npo Bazalt with a Dürr Ndt HD-CR 35 radiography scanner. The contract names this model explicitly. At that time, Npo Bazalt had already been subject to EU sanctions for two years – and therefore should not have had access to this technology.
A shadow corridor into the weapons industry
Even before Russia’s full-scale invasion, importers of sensitive goods had begun establishing networks to evade sanctions. Newcom Nndt is no exception; as early as 2011, the company founded a subsidiary, Alfa-Test – supposedly with the goal of reaching clients who had virtually no chance of obtaining export exemptions.
Right up until shortly before the invasion, Alfa-Test had become supplier to several particularly restricted defence enterprises. Archived procurement documents analysed by CORRECTIV.Europe show that, through its Alfa-Test subsidiary, technology from Dürr Ndt likely reached the Russian military-industrial complex despite sanctions – companies involved in nuclear materials, explosives, air-defence systems and missile technologies.
Documents from Russia’s state public procurement platform indicate that an engineering bureau belonging to the nuclear weapons division of Russian state-owned nuclear conglomerate Rosatom purchased an XR 24 NDT machine, a product still listed on Dürr Ndt’s catalogue at the time of publication. And a Rosatom subsidiary acquired a Dürr Ndt XR 35 system in 2015. And the D. V. Yefremov Institute of Electrophysical Equipment – a manufacturer of components for fusion reactors and superconducting systems – received a Dürr Ndt HD-CR 35 radiography system.
How are policymakers and authorities attempting to prevent – and, in doing so, also protect manufacturers from – dual-use products ending up in the Russian defence industry?
Machine tool exports to Russia tightened by sanctions
EU Regulations 833/2014 and 2021/821 specify which exports are subject to sanctions. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the rules have been continuously tightened to protect EU security interests.
How The Sanctions Against Russia Work
To ensure trade and exports do not compromise the security interests of the exporting country, they are subject to corresponding guidelines. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU sanctioned the export of dual-use goods when the recipient was a weapons company. This regulation was subsequently tightened further, especially in 2022.
Although machine tools are well-suited for classification as dual-purpose goods, such classification is just the first hurdle in a highly complex system: It is often impossible to clearly decide whether a good is intended for military and/or civilian use. Even everyday products can fall under these rules – for example, simple components such as hinges are used both in suitcases and in the weapons industry.
For many years, the Wassenaar Arrangement was decisive internationally, defining which goods are considered dual-use and how their export is controlled. Since 2022, however, the system has been weakened, as Russia is a participant.
For German companies like Dürr Ndt, one thing has not changed over the years: before every export, they must check whether their products are classified as dual-use items and whether the recipient appears on a sanctions list.
In the case of sanctions against Russia, this information can be found in more than 50 Annexes to the EU regulation, spanning hundreds of pages. These Annexes list Russian companies such as Npo Bazalt, to which deliveries of machinery are impermissible. „The classification for companies is extremely complicated and time-consuming”, says Katharina Neckel, head of the foreign trade law and trade facilitation unit at the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce. The chambers can provide support, but do not offer legal advice. „And even they quickly reach their limits due to limited resources and responsibilities.”
If the recipient is not on the sanctions list but the product is classified as dual-use, an export permit is required. The company must then file an application with the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA). The authority examines the recipient, end-use and technical classification, coordinating with other authorities, such as customs, where necessary. Only after official approval has been granted can the item be exported.
German authorities overwhelmed with export controls
„However, the authorities cannot check every export in detail due to bureaucratic complexity and high workloads,” says Christian von Soest, head of the Berlin office at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Companies repeatedly report long processing times and unclear responsibilities between different offices.
Neckel‘s observations are similar: „When the sanctions against Russia were first imposed, BAFA sometimes had processing times of several months. Meanwhile some companies report average processing times of between 20 and 30 days.” Nevertheless, the authority is sometimes overstretched even today. Other experts have confirmed this to CORRECTIV.Europe. Whether BAFA ultimately checks every single application remains doubtful, however. Experts do not believe so. In response to our enquiry, BAFA confirmed the authority’s procedures and commented on the waiting times as follows: In order to „address justified criticism from the business community”, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and BAFA „introduced extensive procedural simplifications and accelerations last year, which have already reduced backlogs and significantly sped up the approval process.” They also emphasised that every application is thoroughly examined.
At the EU’s external borders, exports are controlled by customs authorities – and here, too, problems frequently arise. Documents are generally available, but „if the goods are not clearly labelled and their function is not apparent, it is not easy for customs officers to recognise whether they are dual-use items,” says Frank Buckenhofer, chair of the Customs Police Union. Moreover, the goods sometimes do not match the paperwork.
In Buckenhofer’s view, customs could play a much more significant role in enforcing sanctions. „They have a good overview of who trades with whom across borders,” he says. After sanctions were tightened, he would have liked to have seen targeted risk notifications sent by customs to companies that do a lot of business with Russia. „Germany lacks sufficient awareness of the political or military consequences such exports can have.” Accordingly, from a political standpoint, German customs authorities are poorly equipped to prosecute foreign-trade crime and enforce sanctions.
Neckel notes that many companies now request a so-called null decision – confirmation from the authority that no permit requirement exists for a specific, described export. „This gives companies legal certainty for the individual case. However, a null decision does not replace the company’s own duty to check nor general controls by BAFA or customs. At the same time, companies protect themselves from legal risks and potential reputational damage.”
But neither BAFA nor customs bears sole responsibility: management of respective exporting companies is liable for where their goods ultimately end up. The end-use certificate obliges manufacturers to know precisely where their products finally land. This is intended to prevent goods from being resold or re-exported via intermediaries – but in practice, some companies simply carry on: „This is exactly one of the central problems of Russia sanctions and European export controls,” says von Soest. Attempted or actual violations of sanctions must be reported. Fines or even criminal consequences may follow.
Europe kept delivering to Russia after 2022
The paths through which goods reached Russia from the European continent after 2022 vary greatly: some shipments apparently passed through directly because they slipped through controls. In other cases, delivery documents were likely swapped en route. Exports often passed through third countries and intermediaries to circumvent sanctions.
According to the dataset available to CORRECTIV.Europe and its partners, after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, products manufactured by German company Dürr Ndt stopped reaching Russia directly. They were instead routed via Turkey and China. Dürr Ndt did not respond to enquiries from our editorial team on this matter.
It remains possible that special permits were issued for exports of goods such as the scanner – under the provison that they would be serving humanitarian or medical purposes. In principle, Dürr Ndt’s products could feasibly give that impression. But the list of references on its website points in another direction. It includes names like Airbus Defence & Space, Rheinmetall, Shell and Areva, the latter being a company in the nuclear technology sector.
Dürr Ndt’s exports continued at least until early 2024. Even after the war began, goods valuing almost 1.7 million US dollars found their way onto the Russian market in this manner. Several customs entries note that the equipment originally came from Germany.
In February 2025, Newcom Ndt once again applied to the Russian authorities for permission to import additional CR 35 units from Germany. Whether this was done in coordination with Dürr Ndt is something the editorial team has been unable to establish.
Russia shifts to imports from third countries
That export sanctions have been repeatedly violated can be seen in another investigation by CORRECTIV. „Since the beginning of the invasion, exports from Europe via intermediaries in countries such as Turkey or China have risen significantly,” says von Soest. The abrupt rise in new product groups and exports supplied by these states since 2022 generally cannot be explained by their own production. Von Soest, an export on sanctions, sees this as an indication of possible re-exports to Russia.
Outside Continental Europe, states in Central Asia play a key role in circumventing import sanctions on Russia. Russia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. Exports to a member state of this customs union may be imported directly with reduced or even no additional customs checks. Whilst China is not a member, it has a cooperation agreement with the union, one intention of which is to ease customs controls.
Uwe Cantner, an economist at the University of Jena, explains that circumvention via China was particularly important at the beginning of the invasion. Russia still imports more machine tools from there than it did before 2022, but China can now match the quality of German manufacturers. And the products are comparatively cheaper. „Twenty years ago, import restrictions on dual-use goods would have been an effective sanction – today they are not.”
Von Soest also calls for realistic expectations: Sanctions are an important political signal, but their effectiveness depends heavily on their implementation. „They affect Russia as a whole and increase the cost of waging war. But on their own, they cannot force a change of course.”
Moreover, the circumvention efforts show how difficult it is to implement sanctions effectively: „Trade and payments often shift into shadow networks,” says von Soest. This is why ongoing sanctions and export controls must be constantly tightened.
According to Cantner, assessing the impact of EU sanctions within Russia is difficult. Claims from the country can hardly be verified for credibility. „Economic sanctions are always better than military measures. Even if Europe bears the cost, it is usually monetary and not paid for in human lives”
On 9 November, Sergey posts to his Telegram channel another find of an armed Gerbera drone, writing that it must be assumed the explosive charge is still live – and even if the drone has landed, it could be remotely detonated after a delay. By the time of this post, the war in Ukraine has been raging for 1,354 days, and more than 14,000 civilians have been killed.
Investigation and text: Dylan Carter, Lilith Grull, Frida ThurmData und visualization : Luc Martinon, Dylan CarterEditing: Justus von DanielsFacktchecking: Marius Münstermann, Rose Mintzer-Sweeney
Design: Mohamed Anwar
Collage: Ivo Mayr
