Davide F. Jabes is a historian specialising in the political and military history of the modern era, with a particular focus on the Second World War and the structures of power within totalitarian regimes. His research combines archival investigation with institutional analysis to examine decision-making processes, systems of control, and the interaction between ideology and governance in contexts of conflict.

His work also extends to the history of the Catholic Church in the eighteenth century, exploring the relationship between ecclesiastical institutions and political authority. He is the author of a biographical study of Adolf Hitler, published by Solferino, which situates the dictator’s leadership within the broader political and military dynamics of the war.

How Did the System Work? The Catholic Church and the Management of Sexual Abuse Cases under National Socialism

The historical context

Within the framework of the complex and often conflictual relations between the National Socialist regime and religious institutions, a decisive element lay in Adolf Hitler’s very conception of power. In his case, the boundaries between public and private were largely blurred: the Führer, in any context, was always, first and foremost, the Führer. Under these premises, it was almost inevitable that, once he had consolidated power, Hitler would not only persecute Jews, Marxists, “asocials,” and people with disabilities, as already discussed, but would also direct his hostility toward the religious denominations in Germany, notwithstanding the concordat signed with the Catholic Church in July 1933 and the regime’s efforts to present itself as the defender of traditional and Christian values against the ideological barbarism of Marxism.

In fact, the Churches were among the few institutions that remained outside the totalitarian claims of National Socialism. For this reason, Hitler sought to subordinate them to his authority and drastically reduce their influence within German society. Mindful of the failure of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf against the Catholics, however, he attempted to avoid a direct confrontation with Christian faith and culture in Germany, particularly in view of the signing of the concordat between the German government and the Holy See on 20 July 1933, which represented a significant political success for the regime. Shortly after the concordat was concluded, however, episodes of violence and intimidation against Catholic associations and the Catholic press began to occur. Several Catholic civil servants were dismissed, and the director of Catholic Action, Erich Klausener, was assassinated on 30 June 1934 during the “Night of the Long Knives.” [1] Nevertheless, there were no significant protests from the Catholic hierarchy, which was unwilling to jeopardise the agreement reached with the German state, led by a Führer who had in any case been raised in the Catholic faith. The Protestant churches—particularly the German Christian movement, founded in 1932 with the aim of creating a synthesis between Protestantism and Nazi ideology—welcomed Hitler’s seizure of power with considerable enthusiasm. Only a few voices expressed criticism of the new regime, partly as a result of the Lutheran tradition that linked the Church closely to secular authority. [2]

Hitler sought to counterbalance the Catholic Church by promoting the creation of a single Reich Church that would unite the twenty-eight regional Protestant churches in Germany. To this end, he entrusted the German Christian Ludwig Müller, a military chaplain at the Königsberg garrison, with the task of implementing the project of a national Protestant church as quickly as possible. With the support of the government, Müller was appointed Reich Bishop by a national synod on 27 September 1933 and placed at the head of the Reichskirche (Reich Church). [3]

Hitler believed that he had thereby completed the Gleichschaltung in the religious sphere as well. Between 29 and 31 May 1934 the first synod of the German Confessing Church (Bekennende Kirche) was held in Barmen, likewise in opposition to Bishop Müller and the Reich Evangelical Church. The Barmen Theological Declaration of 31 May 1934, largely drafted by the theologian Karl Barth, represented a clear break with the regime’s totalitarian claims and its interference in religious affairs, affirming that the sole foundation of the Church’s preaching was the word of God. [4]

Disappointed with the Protestants, yet sufficiently pragmatic not to push the conflict further for the time being—the final reckoning with the Churches was envisaged only after the end of the Second World War—from the summer of 1936 Hitler sought to move closer to the Catholics, with the aim of forming a common anti-Bolshevik front, also encouraged by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. On 4 November 1936 Hitler received the Archbishop of Munich, Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, at Obersalzberg. [5] Despite the positive outcome of the meeting, German Catholics and bishops continued to express their dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to comply with the terms of the Concordat. At the same time, however, the Catholic Church showed itself willing to support the regime in its struggle against Bolshevism. On 21 March 1937, Palm Sunday, the dormant tensions between the government and the Catholic Church were reignited by the publication of the papal encyclical Mit brennender Sorge (“With Burning Concern”), which openly declared the incompatibility between faith in Christ and Nazi ideology. [6]

The regime responded with a harsh smear campaign against the Catholic Church, which culminated in a speech delivered by Goebbels in Berlin on 28 May, during which the Minister of Propaganda denounced the alleged sexual immorality of the clergy. Goebbels had in fact overseen the press campaigns aimed at discrediting the Church by exploiting the trials concerning sexual abuse committed by priests against young members of religious institutions in Germany. [7] Toward the end of the year, however, Hitler scaled back the campaign against the Catholic Church. Having decided to pursue a more openly expansionist foreign policy, he considered it unwise, for the time being, to further worsen relations with the Vatican and the German Catholic clergy. For similar reasons, he refrained from taking a definitive decision regarding the Protestant churches and their organisation, although the most prominent representatives of the Confessing Church continued to face persecution. More generally, from the end of 1937 to 1939 Hitler—now determined to wage war—placed the struggle against the Churches in the background.

The documents

The documentation discussed in this study has already been examined by scholars, but generally within the framework of internal debates within the Church and never analysed in detail in order to answer a more fundamental question: how did the institutional system responsible for judging cases of sexual abuse committed by priests actually function? The individual documents presented here are therefore analysed from this specific perspective. The focus of the research is thus shifted away from theological interpretations and toward the concrete responses of the Roman authorities, in particular Pius XI, the Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli, and the broader machinery of the pontifical bureaucracy.
As will become clear, when there was a real danger that sensitive documentation might fall into hostile hands, the most extreme response adopted was the destruction of the documents themselves. In the modern period, a decisive turning point was the seizure of a large part of the papal archives by Napoleon’s French troops. This episode profoundly affected the Church’s archival policies, and during later political crises—such as those following the revolutions of 1848—the destruction of documents came to be considered an acceptable measure.

This practice was not limited to the events of 1849, but formed part of a broader tradition in which the papal archive was regarded as the “state archive” of the pope as sovereign. Secrecy and, when deemed necessary, the destruction of sensitive records—particularly during the uprisings of 1831 and 1848–1849—became part of a strategy aimed at safeguarding doctrine and temporal authority.
The destruction of documents in the contemporary period must also be understood within this established archival practice. Evidence of this can be found, for example, in the destruction of the archives of the apostolic nunciature in Budapest shortly before the entry of Soviet troops into the Hungarian capital in February 1945. [8] The documents analysed in the following pages should therefore be read within this broader institutional context, in which the preservation—or deliberate destruction—of archival material formed an integral part of the Church’s strategies for managing crises and protecting its authority.

Further confirmation of this institutional logic emerges from documents preserved in the “Archivio della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede” concerning the situation of the German dioceses during and immediately after the Nazi period on the matter of sex crimes. A letter dated 12 April 1938, number of protocol 421/1936 from the Sant’Ufficio (the former Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede) and addressed to the Bishop of Münster, Clemens August von Galen, responds to a request made by the German episcopate regarding the possibility of derogating from the norms established by the 1922 Instruction De modo procedendi in causis sollicitationis. The Holy Office granted the faculty to deal with cases of crimen pessimum according to the ordinary canonical procedure, but at the same time reaffirmed the centrality of the special legislation governing cases of sollicitatio, stating that “ob specialem huius criminis condicionem, id concedi non potest.” Another significant detail emerges from the same file. In the margin of the document there is a handwritten note stating: “Not sent because yesterday, 11 April, the Bishop of Münster [von Galen] came to the S.O. [Sant’Officio, Holy Office] and said that he preferred verbal communication so as not to keep documents of this kind with him.” This annotation indicates that the written communication was deliberately withheld in order to avoid leaving potentially compromising documentation in the possession of the local ecclesiastical authorities. The episode further illustrates the degree of caution with which these matters were handled and the importance attributed to limiting the circulation of written evidence concerning cases of clerical misconduct.

Even in this case, the decision did not arise from a different assessment of the seriousness of the abuses, but from the need to maintain institutional control over procedures and to protect the sacrament of confession, which remained the principal point of reference for the juridical qualification of the offence. [9] Another document dated 6 August 1936, originating from the Holy Office (with no protocol number but answering directly to the document from Germany 421/36), clearly shows the direct intervention of the pontiff in the decision-making process regarding the handling of cases of sollicitatio and crimen pessimum. The letter responds to the difficulties reported by the German episcopate in applying the procedure set out in the Instruction of 9 June 1922 and emphasises that the matter had been brought personally to the attention of the Pope. The text explicitly states that, ‘having referred the matter to the Holy Father in the audience of Thursday 6th of this month, His Holiness has entrusted to the wise and prudent counsel of Your Eminence to regulate the cases in question’.

This passage shows that the final decision was not left exclusively to the administrative bodies of the Curia, but directly involved the pontiff, who, while avoiding setting a general regulatory solution, delegated to the competent cardinal the power to decide on a case-by-case basis according to criteria of expediency. The concluding formula, “prout magis opportunum expedire iudicaverit in Domino”, reinforces this logic of discretion, entrusting the concrete management of the proceedings to the prudent judgement of the ecclesiastical authority. [10]

In his study The Vatican and Hitler, Alessandro Bellino interprets the episode of the exemptions requested by the German bishops primarily within the context of the conflict between the Holy See and the Nazi regime. According to the author’s account, the papal decision emerged from a process of internal consultation within the Roman Curia. Pius XI, having been informed of the request, invited the Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli—regarded as an “expert on German affairs”—to give his opinion, noting that the granting of the exemptions also depended on the reliability of the bishops requesting them and on their ability to use them prudently. The Pope nevertheless declared himself willing to grant immediately the necessary faculties for the procedure relating to the crimen pessimum, should Pacelli express a favourable opinion.

According to Alfredo Ottaviani’s notes, a few days later Pacelli confirmed this line, emphasising “the extremely delicate situation in Germany” and the inappropriateness—if not the impossibility—of drawing up and preserving documentation relating to such proceedings. In this context he considered it appropriate to grant the bishops the requested dispensations not only for cases of crimen pessimum, but also for those of sollicitatio, with certain reservations concerning the Bishop of Freiburg, Conrad Gröber. In April the dispensation was finally communicated to the bishops concerned. Bellino interprets this process as the result of the operational difficulties encountered by the Catholic Church in Nazi Germany: the Holy Office, not fully informed about the local situation, tended to assert its juridical competence, whereas the German bishops, under pressure from the regime, needed to act swiftly without waiting for the lengthy procedures of the Roman Curia.

Such an interpretation, however, tends to situate the episode almost exclusively within the framework of the political confrontation between the Holy See and National Socialism. [11] In this way, the concrete problem of proceedings relating to clerical abuse largely recedes into the background. The document cited shows, in fact, that the issue concerned not only the operational difficulties faced by the Church under the Nazi regime, but also the explicit decision to avoid the production and preservation of documentation relating to such proceedings. Pacelli’s concern regarding the “inappropriateness” of drafting and preserving records cannot therefore be interpreted solely as a defensive measure imposed by political circumstances. Rather, it reveals a broader institutional logic in which the control of documentation and the limitation of the traceability of proceedings constituted fundamental tools for the management of potentially scandalous cases.

In this sense, Bellino’s interpretation—by emphasising above all the conflictual dimension between the Church and the nazi regime—tends to downplay the significance of this decision.
Another document considered, dated 14 March 1938 and drafted in the hours immediately following the Anschluss, testifies to the urgency with which circles within the Roman Curia addressed the risk that Austrian ecclesiastical archives might fall into the hands of the Nazi authorities.
A note from Bishop Alois Hudal, dated 14 March 1938 and most likely addressed to Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini, confirms the urgency with which the matter was addressed in the hours immediately following the Anschluss. In the text Hudal writes:

“I request that, if possible by means of a coded telegram, a notice be sent to the Nunciature in Vienna so that all material concerning cases of immorality by priests preserved in the episcopal curias and in the archives of congregations and religious orders in Austria be immediately and without exception burned, and that the corresponding protocol numbers also be deleted. […] The matter is extremely delicate but very urgent.” [12]

The note was not an official document and had therefore not been registered with a protocol number. It was subsequently filed using a simple page number written in pencil. Since the highest page number visible in the file is 29, and it now consists of only six pages—with most of the material missing—it is reasonable to conclude that several pages were removed or otherwise suppressed. [13]
The request, addressed to the Vatican Secretariat of State, appears to reflect a position originating within the Holy Office, which proposed the systematic destruction of documentation considered compromising for fear that it might fall into the hands of the Nazi authorities. The document was first published in May 2022 in a work by David Kertzer, where it appears only in a footnote and is not examined in relation to the issue discussed in this article. A few months later, in November 2022, Andrea Riccardi also referred to the document, placing it within the broader context of the Church’s struggle to defend itself against National Socialism. Interpreted in this way, the episode is presented primarily as a defensive measure adopted in response to the threat posed by the Nazi regime, which tends to downplay the significance of the decision to destroy documentation relating to cases of clerical misconduct. [14]

The way in which these principles were applied in the context of Nazi Germany emerges with particular clarity from a memorandum of the Holy Office dated 24 February 1946. The document recalls that “sub dominatione hitleriana in Archidioecesi Coloniensi complures sacerdotes (circiter viginti) propter crimen pessimum et alia delicta… denunciati sunt.” However, following instructions transmitted to the German ordinaries during the period of persecution, no formal canonical proceedings were initiated against these priests: “contra dictos sacerdotes processus ecclesiasticus non est instructus.” Instead of a trial, they were simply suspended from ministry or deprived of their confessional jurisdiction. The reason for this choice is stated explicitly in the same document: “propter scandala inde timenda non convenire videbatur formalis processus ad tramitem juris instruere.” In other words, the fear of scandal made it preferable to avoid a public trial conducted according to the formal procedures of canon law.

A subsequent annotation, dated 7 March 1946, shows that this line remained substantially valid in the immediate post-war period. It records that Pius XII considered it appropriate to entrust “rem remittendam esse prudentiae Episcoporum,” that is, to leave the management of these cases to the prudence of the bishops. At the same time, it recommended that, in the changed historical circumstances, the rehabilitation of the priests involved should not be granted too readily and that a more rigorous approach should be adopted.

Although these documents are known and have been mentioned in the work of some scholars, they have rarely been cited directly and their significance has never been fully emphasised. [15] This reflects a broader historiographical tendency in which studies focus primarily on theological interpretations or on contextualising specific periods in the history of the Church, rather than undertaking a close analysis of the documents themselves. Yet it is precisely such a documentary analysis that allows us to address a more fundamental question: how did the institutional system responsible for handling cases of sexual abuse within the Church actually function? By examining these documents individually and in their concrete administrative context, it becomes possible to reconstruct the mechanisms through which the Roman authorities managed these cases and to identify the decision-making processes within the pontifical bureaucracy. In this sense, the documents analysed here do not merely illuminate individual episodes, but reveal the institutional functioning of the ecclesiastical system that governed the treatment of clerical sexual offences.

Taken together, these documents clearly reveal the institutional logic that guided the Church’s handling of abuse cases. Even when the Roman authorities were aware that numerous accusations had been made, the preferred solution remained to avoid formal judicial proceedings that might publicly expose the scandal. The primary concern was therefore not the recognition of the violence suffered by victims, but the preservation of ecclesiastical order and the protection of the reputation of the clergy. Read in their concrete documentary context, however, these texts show clearly that the marginalisation of victims was not merely the accidental result of difficult political circumstances, such as those created by the Nazi regime, but rather a structural consequence of the way in which the problem was defined and addressed within the legal and institutional culture of the Church.

Footnotes

[1] V. Ullrich, Hitler l’ascesa 1889 – 1939, trad. di S. Adami et al. (Mondadori: Milano, 2019) (Adolf Hitler. Biographie, Band 1. Die Jahre des Aufstiegs 1889 – 1939, Frankfurt am Main, 2013), p. 598.
[2] Id., pp. 599-600
[3] Id., p. 601.
[4] Id., p. 603.
[5] Id., p. 605.
[6] Id., p. 607.
[7] Götz Aly, Wie konnte das geschehen? DEUTSCHLAND 1933 – 1945 (S. Fisher: Frankfurt am Main, 2025), pp. 210-211.
[8] “Le carte dell’archivio della Nunziatura rela-ve agli anni dell’incarico di Ro2a, precisamente quelle tra gli anni 1939-1945, e i registri dall’anno 1932, furono bruciate per la decisione del nunzio all’inizio dell’invasione della capitale da parte delle truppe sovie-che nell’anno 1945.” Katalin Nagy et al., L’Archivio della Nunziatura Apostolica in Ungheria (1920-1939) (Collectanea Archivi Va-cani: Budapest-Ci2à del Va-cano, 2024), p. XII.
[9] ACDF, Priv. S.O. 1936, Germania, 421/21, registered 12 April 1938.
[10] ACDF, Priv. S.O. 1936, Germania, from the Suprema Congregazione del S. Offizio to cardinal Schulte, dated 6 August 1936, Ci2à del Va-cano.
[11] Alessandro Bellino, Il VaScano e Hitler, Santa Sede, Chiesa tedesca e nazismo (1922-1939) (Guerini e Associa:Milano, 2018), pp. 236-240.
[12] ASRS, AAEESS, Fondo Spogli, Scatole bianche, pos. 1, ff. 25-30.
[13] Id.
[14] David I. Kertzer, Un papa in guerra, La storia segreta di Mussolini, Hitler e Pio XII (Rizzoli: Milano, 2022), p. 566; Andrea Riccardi, La guerra del silenzio, Pio XII, il nazismo, gli ebrei (Laterza: Bari, 2022), p. 133.
[15] h2ps://shs.cairn.info/journal-20-21-revue-d-histoire-2024-3-page-3?lang=en (as seen the 11 March 2026).

Bibliography

Archives
ACDF, Priv. S.O. 1936, Germania.
ASRS, AAEESS, Fondo Spogli, Scatole bianche, pos. 1.

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Articles
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Desmazières Agnès, Confron-ng scandal: The repression of child sexual abuse among the clergy
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